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sions have shifted the burden of proof from the shareholder to the
Association.la As a practical matter this is correct. It is the association which has access and control over the records and it should be
required to see that they are properly kept and preserved.

LEGISLATION
AMENDATORY ACT EFFECTIVE AFTER LAPSE OF ORIGINAL
STATUTE HELD VALID
In 1941 the General Assembly of Indiana attempted to amend
the already twice-amended Milk Control Law of 1935. The amendatory act was passed and approved by the Governor while the original
law was in force and valid. But the Indiana Constitution expressly
provides that a statute, even after being validly passed and approved,
does not become effective until it has been published and circulated
in the counties of the state by authority, unless it contains an emergency clause. IND. CONST. ART. IV, § 28. The present statute contained
no emergency clause, and the Governor did not proclaim its publication until after the original act had expired. Held, the amendatory act
was valid upon its passage and approval, and became effective upon its
publication and proclamation by the Governor. Milk Control Board v.
Pursifull, 36 N.E. (2d) 850 (Ind. 1941).
The rule is well settled in Indiana that an act seeking to amend
a non-existent statute is invalid. Draper v. Falley, 33 Ind. 465 (1870) ;
Kramer v. Beebe, 186 Ind. 349, 115 N.E. 83 (1917); Ross v. Chambers, 214 Ind. 223, 14 N.E. (2d) 1012 (1938).
But the court in the
instant case pointed out that in previous cases involving such amendments, the legislative machinery had not 'been put in motion while
the original act was in existence. The original act had, on the contrary, been previously repealed or judicially declared invalid before
the amendment was attempted. Straus Bros. Co. v. Fisher, 200 Ind.
307, 163 N.E. 205 (1928). The court realistically distinguished a case
almost in point. Metsker v. Whitsell, 181 Ind. 126, 103 N.E. 1078
(1914). That case, which concerned the validity of the first of two
amendatory acts passed at the same session of the General Assembly,
held that it was invalid because the act passed second in point of
time contained an emergency clause and became effective immediately.
Therefore, by the time that the first act was to take effect, the original statute had been amended out of existence by the second act. The
court also based its decision upon the rule that as between two inconsistent acts passed by the same legislature, the one passed subsequently will prevail. The court in the principal case declared that
1

3 In re Bell, 339 Pa. 443, 15 A. (2d) 350 (1940); In re Yonah Building & Loan Ass'n., 133 Pa. Super. 538, 540, 3 A. (2d) 49, 53
(1938). This latter case is clearly analogous to the Fuzy case,
supra, note 12. More than five years had elapsed between the
notice of withdrawal and the insolvency of the association. The
court said that the association undoubtedly thought itself solvent
during the intervening period, but if it was in fact insolvent then
it was the duty of the association to show that the association
was actually insolvent. See also, Gilbert v. Beacon Hill Credit
Union, 287 Mass. 493, 192 N.E. 25 (1934).
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NOTES AND COMMENTS

since the last-named rule was sufficient to support the holding in
Metsker v. Whitsell, supra, the case could be distinguished. The fact
that the court rather arbitrarily decided that the former ground
rather than the latter was dicta indicates the fineness of the distinction. Moreover, it indicates a disposition by the court to shift from
a conceptual application of the rule to a realistic one.
If the court had literally applied the Indiana rule that an act
which amends a non-existent statute is invalid, it would have placed
itself in the absurd position of holding that a statute which is validly
passed and approved but which is not formally published and proclaimed
until eight days after the original act expires is totally ineffective.
The root of the difficulty is the Indiana rule, which is a minority
position. The decisions of the federal courts on this point have consistently been contra. Columbia Wire Co. v. Boyce, 104 Fed. 172
(C.C.A. 7th, 1900); see City of Beatrice v. Masslich, 108 Fed. 743, 746
(C.C.A. 8th, 1901). Although the decisions in the state courts are in
conflict, the definite weight of authority opposes the Indiana rule.
Fenolio v. Sebastian Bridge Dist., 133 Ark. 380, 200 S.W. 501 (1917);
Attorney General ex rel. Burbank v. Stryker, 141 Mich. 437, 104 N.W.
737 (1905). The majority rule applies to statutes that have been
declared unconstitutional as well as to those that have been repealed.
JONES, STATUTE LAW MAKING (1923) 185.

TORTS
STATUTORY VIOLATION LABELED NEGLIGENCE PER SE
The Arkansas State Highway Commission, pursuant to its authority to regulate load limits, filed suit to recover damages sustained
when defendant's overloaded truck caused a bridge to collapse. The
trial court submitted the issue of negligence to the jury which found
for the defendant, although the statute expressly declared that any
violator should be held civilly liable for damage. On appeal, held:
reversed. The defendant's violation of the regulation constituted negligence per se. Arkansas State Highway Comm. v. Mode, 157 S.W.
(2d) 53 (Ark. 1942).
A majority of jurisdictions deem violations of traffic statutes
to be negligence per se. Martin v. Herzog, 228 N.Y. 164, 126 N.E. 814
(1920); Winder & Son v. Blaine, 29 N.E. (2d) 987 (Ind. 1940);
cf. Note (1918) 28 YALE L.J. 91. Arkansas and a few other states,
however, have held such violations to be mere evidence of negligence.
Shipp v. Missouri Pacific Transp. Co., 197 Ark. 104, 122 S.W. (2d)
593 (1939); Hansen v. Kemmish, 210 Iowa 1008, 208 N.W. 277 (1926);
Note (1930) 10 B.U.L. REV. 211, 219. Here the court decided that a
clause in the statute expressly imposing civil liability upon violators
has the effect of making breaches ordinarily accepted only as evidence
of negligence, into negligence per se.
The court should have ruled for the plaintiff without any reliance upon common law doctrines of negligence. Cf. Thayer, Public
Wrong and Private Action (1913) 27 HARV. L. REV. 317, 319-328 with
Lowndes, Civil Liability Created by Criminal Legislation (1932) 16

